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CONTROVERSIAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM:
DAUBERT AND THE LAW'S HUBRIS
Paul S. Milich*
Television star Roseanne Arnold's announcement that psychotherapy
had enabled her to recall long repressed memories of her parents sexually
abusing her from the time she was an infant heightened public attention
to the theory that memories of incest could be totally repressed and then
accurately recalled decades later. The theory has intuitive appeal. The
idea that people repress unpleasant memories and emotions that later can
be recalled in therapy goes at least as far back as Sigmund Freud.'
When a troubled young man similarly recalled repressed memories of
being abused by a cardinal of the Catholic Church, only a murmur of
skepticism was voiced in the press. When the young man retracted his
accusation, doubting the reliability of his own repressed memories, the
press finally took notice of the fact that there was very little scientific
support, and much skepticism, for the proposition that traumatic memo-
ries could be completely repressed for years and then suddenly and accu-
rately recalled.2 The scientific skeptics do not claim that all recalled re-
pressed memories are false-there is no proof of that. But nor is there
empirical proof that such recollections are generally authentic.' In short,
there is no scientific basis for gauging the probability that a recalled re-
pressed memory in a particular case is substantially true or false.
In light of the absence of scientific support for the accuracy of recalled
repressed memories, one would expect trial courts to be most cautious in
admitting expert testimony to support the reliability of the alleged victim's
recollection. Some courts have been, but many have not, often leaving the
unresolved scientific questions of whether recalled repressed memories are
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law.
Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution
About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRM. L. & COmi-
NOLOGY 129, 132-35 (1993).
2 See Elizabeth Loftus, The Reality Of Repressed Memories, 48 Am. PSYCH. 518 (1993) (review-
ing the scientific literature). Adding to doubts concerning the reliability of "repressed memories" is the
use of sodium amytal or hypnosis in some cases to facilitate the recollection in therapy. Id.
' Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 1, at 128.
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reliable for the jury to consider and ultimately resolve.4
Juries often are asked to resolve technical issues and expert witnesses
are used to assist them in those tasks. But it is a whole other matter to ask
the jury to also decide whether the underlying principles and methodolo-
gies used by the experts are scientifically reliable. In our rush to accept
the very latest that modern science has to offer, we risk the absurd scena-
rio of lay judges and juries judging the reliability of novel and controver-
sial scientific evidence before science itself has completed its investigation
and reached its own judgment.5
The much maligned Frye rule stood for a simple proposition: trial
courts should not accept scientific evidence unless and until science accepts
it.' The conservatism of this proposition was a primary cause in the
downfall of the Frye rule. But before we say our final good-byes to Frye,
we should recall the reason for the rule's conservatism and ask whether
the new approach outlined by the Supreme Court in Daubert 7 will do a
better job than Frye of handling the interface between science and the
courtroom.8
We accept science in the courtroom because we have confidence in the
methods and respect for the achievements of science. The law gives science
4 See, e.g., Hewczuk v. Sambor, 803 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("It is not at all
unreasonable to suppose that... [the sexual abuse] would be totally repressed and excluded from her
consciousness."-issue of reliability left to jury); Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1989);
Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1993). But see Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
The reported decisions on "repressed memories" primarily concern whether they toll the applicable
statute of limitations. But nearly all of the cases allow the issue to survive summary judgment on the
statute of limitations issue and leave the scientific question of the reliability of repressed memories to
the jury.
5 Professor Giannelli cites the example of trial courts "deeming" certain studies as sufficient to
validate voice print science, only to have the National Academy of Sciences cast doubt on this conclu-
sion. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1213 (1980). See also Andre A. Moenssens, Novel
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
1-2 (1993).
6 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (party offering scientific evidence
must show "general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.").
7 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
' Giannelli, supra note 5, at 1224 ("The question is not whether Frye embodies a conservative
approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence (which it does) but rather whether such conserva-
tism is justified. Thus, the critical issue is whether other approaches can better achieve the Frye
objective . . ").
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a special status in the courtroom, one denied to astrologers, mystics, and
others who practice alternative modes of knowledge. Moreover, much of
what science gives us we do not fully understand. Like a black box whose
inner workings are a mystery, we see only the results; and even the results
sometimes must be explained to us before we understand their
significance.
The law, in short, places great faith in scientific knowledge; the same
kind of faith each of us shows when we step onto an airplane or drive
across a long bridge with little fear or doubt. Our faith in science is quali-
fied by the recognition that there is a difference between established or
proven science and scientific work that is still under review. Few of us
would volunteer to be the first to fly in an airplane or cross a bridge that
was so "experimental" that experts still were debating whether it would
work. The Frye rule asserted that the law's faith in science must not race
ahead of science itself. If we trust science's claims of reliability in most
cases, we should heed its expressions of hesitation and doubt in others.9
Of course, "science" is not a monolithic institution but a wide assembly
of diverse, and sometimes quarreling, disciplines. This was one problem
with the Frye rule; it presumed an identifiable, pertinent scientific com-
munity whose consensus views on any issue could be easily tapped.10 This
unrealistic view of science made the Frye rule seem unnecessarily con-
servative, out of touch with the increasingly specialized world of science in
which the development and dissemination of new ideas and techniques
does not always take the traditional scientific path. 1
Dissatisfaction with Frye led courts in two different directions. One ap-
proach, the so-called "relevancy approach," lowered the hurdles to the
admission of novel and controversial scientific evidence. Such evidence
need not be generally accepted in the scientific community but only sup-
9 See Moenssens, supra note 5, at 4-5 ("I urge caution because its absence is the antithesis of the
scientific method; lack of caution leads to grievous error that tends to bring forensic science into
disrepute.").
10 See Giannelli, supra note 5, at 1208.
x For example, should a court applying the Frye rule to the issue of repressed memories look to
opinion in the greater psychological community where experimental and clinical psychologists have
long debated the nature of and need for traditional empirical validation of psychological theories? Or
should the court look to the subgroup of clinicians who specialize in treating incest survivors? For a
summary of the problems in applying Frye, see Giannelli, supra note 5, at 1208-23.
1994]
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ported by a qualified expert. Questions concerning the reliability of the
evidence are left to the jury.
12
The relevancy approach has been the main target of those campaigning
against "junk science" in the courtroom."3 By requiring so little in the
way of proven reliability or general scientific acceptance before admitting
the testimony of an expert, the relevancy approach allows hired experts to
pitch intuitively persuasive but scientifically unreliable theories and tech-
niques to a nonscientist jury. Ill-equipped to actually judge science on its
own terms, the jury is left with two choices: (1) ignore the scientific issues
and decide the outcome of the case based on other factors;1 4 or (2) resolve
the technical issues by siding with the expert who has the greatest credi-
bility.15 Yet even when evaluating the credibility of experts, nonscientist
jurors may have little knowledge as to what makes an expert in a particu-
lar field a credible scientist.
In contrast to the more lenient versions of the relevancy approach, some
courts modified Frye by inviting trial judges to go beyond "merely count-
ing heads in the scientific community" in a search for "general accept-
ance," and instead to make a preliminary determination, based on all the
evidence and the judge's own resources, of whether the evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable to be admitted at trial. 6 Implied in this approach is the
assumption that the trial judge is better able to evaluate novel or contro-
versial scientific evidence than jurors and thus should handle more of the
work in this area.
The majority opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 17 is
in sympathy with this latter approach. The trial judge must determine
's See Giannelli, supra note 5, at 1232-45. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co. 736 F.2d
1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
13 See generally Peter Huber, Medical Experts and the Ghost of Galileo, LAW. & CoNrsP.
PRoas., Summer 1991, at 119.
"' In a case with highly technical issues, the side with the weaker technical case has some incen-
tive to "blow smoke" over the technical issues, hoping the jury will despair of understanding those
issues and decide the case on nontechnical factors.
'5 It is no secret that trial attorneys seek experts who are not only knowledgeable, but look and
sound like "experts." Gray hair and an english accent are most preferred.
1" Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d. 389, 395-96 (Ga. 1982). See Giannelli, supra note 5, at 1219-21.
17 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The unanimous portion of the Daubert opinion held that the Frye
rule did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The majority portion of the
opinion, to which two Justices dissented, made some "general observations" about how trial courts
should apply FED. R. Evm. 702 to scientific evidence offered at trial. Id. at 2796, 2799.
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whether novel or controversial scientific evidence has that level of reliabil-
ity required to pass as "scientific knowledge" under Federal Rule 702.28
Although general acceptance in the scientific community is "an important
factor" in establishing the required degree of reliability, it is not neces-
sary.19 It is enough if the offered evidence is derived from the scientific
method. "Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate valida-
tion-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known."20 In making this reli-
ability assessment, the trial judge may use any sources, including of
course, the testimony of experts. Ultimately, however, it is the trial judge's
decision whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable.2
While Daubert expresses a clear bias in favor of the rigorous empirical
methods of the traditional "hard sciences," it is not clear whether this was
due to the hard science nature of the issues in the underlying case or
reflects a broader approach. The Daubert opinion never mentions the psy-
chological sciences, for example, where much of the data is subjective and
many of the theories are empirically difficult, if not impossible, to verify.
An experimental psychologist, for example, would demand "hard" evi-
dence of the reliability of repressed memories, while a psychoanalyst
might require much less or rely more heavily on anecdotal evidence.2 2 It is
unclear whether the Daubert Court's emphasis on traditional methods of
testing and validation means the Court would side with the experimental
psychologists in a dispute over the reliability of repressed memories or
whether the Court would adjust its notion of what is sufficient scientific
validation when dealing with the softer sciences.2"
I have two main concerns about the Daubert opinion: (1) it requires
nonscientist trial judges to evaluate science in a way that may exceed their
scientific abilities; and (2) it is too vague on the degree of reliability that
the trial judges are supposed to be looking for.
Is Id. at 2795. The underlying scientific issue in Daubert was the scientific validity of the prind-
ples and methods used by plaintiffs to prove that the drug Bendectin, taken by pregnant mothers to
control nausea, could cause birth defects. Id. at 2789-90.
19 Id. at 2797.
20 Id. at 2795.
21 Id. at 2796.
22 See Ersndorff & Loftus, supra note 1, at 134.
33 See Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 229 (Wash. 1986).
1994]
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Judges As Amateur Scientists
There is a significant difference between the question, "Is X scientifi-
cally reliable?" and the question, "Do scientists consider X scientifically
reliable?" The first is asking a scientific question and demands a scientific
answer; i.e., the kind of evidence, proof, and explanation required by
scientists in the pertinent field. Thus a judge asking the first question
must review the evidence "internally," evaluating the principles and
methodologies underlying the evidence.
The second question, "Do scientists consider X scientifically reliable?"
is a Frye-type question. Instead of trying to determine whether the offered
evidence is good or bad science based on the scientific value of the evi-
dence, the court undertakes an "external" review of whether good scien-
tists who have done an internal review of the evidence, consider it to be
scientifically reliable. It involves evaluating the scientific credibility of the
experts rather than trying to evaluate the scientific reliability of the evi-
dence directly.
Daubert dearly asks the first question, putting trial judges in the posi-
tion of making substantive, internal reviews of scientific work. Daubert
contemplates that trial judges will combine external review (what scien-
tists think) and internal review (the judge's evaluation of the science), but
the latter is given primacy. 4 The majority in Daubert expressed its confi-
dence that "federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review." 25
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist worried that the majority opinion requires
trial judges to become "amateur scientists" to fulfill their gatekeeping
role.2" Indeed, the federal judiciary appears to be gearing up to perform
24 Id. at 2796-97. The inquiry's "overreaching subject is the scientific validity-and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The fo-
cus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they gener-
ate." Id. at 2797. The Daubert opinion does not bar a trial judge from relying solely on what scien-
tists say concerning the reliability issues. This would seem the most prudent course for judges who
feel uncomfortable analyzing science on its own terms.
25 Id. at 2796.
26 Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This issue is not new. As Judge Learned Hand wrote
in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) ("1 cannot stop
without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it possible for a man
without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these....





Most federal judges are bright individuals but we sorely underestimate
the complexity of many scientific controversies, particularly those involv-
ing complex quantitative analyses, when we presume that nonscientist
judges can master the technical issues to the point that they should feel
comfortable deciding what is or is not good science in a particular case.28
Scientists who have spent the greater portions of their professional lives
wrestling with the complexities and mysteries of their disciplines must be
amazed at the law's hubris in thinking that nonscientist judges can "get
up to speed" on a scientific dispute and ultimately decide who has the
better of the argument.29
Perhaps the Daubert court believed that the only way to escape Frye
was to make scientific validity per se the ultimate question and the opin-
ions of scientists on that question would be merely one of several sources
in making that determination. But this was unnecessary ° and a bit self-
deceiving. It was unnecessary because one can reject Frye's "austere stan-
dard""1 of general acceptance in the scientific community without rejecting
the proposition, implicit in Frye, that courts should defer to scientific
27 See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining A Role for
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995 (1994). Although
Daubert only spoke to the practice of the federal courts under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule
702 has been adopted in 38 states and Daubert likely will have significant influence in those states.
See, e.g., State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993) (adopting reasoning of Daubert); but see,
Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d (Fla. 1993) (declining to abandon Frye for Daubert). As inappropriate
as it is for federal judges to be consigned the role of amateur scientists evaluating the scientific reliabil-
ity of evidence on its scientific merits, it may pose even greater challenges for state trial judges who
often command fewer resources, such as law clerks, funds for court-appointed experts and the time
required to ponder the science, than the federal judiciary.
" When the late Irving Younger summarized the test for novel scientific evidence as whether it
rested "upon the laws of nature," (quoted in Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ga. 1982)), he
had in mind a simpler scientific world. A good deal of the controversy and complexity of novel scien-
tific evidence concerns not the "laws of nature" but the laws of mathematics and probabilities. Statis-
tics are not only part of the epidemiological evidence in cases like Daubert but accompany much of the
new generation of forensic evidence such as DNA typing and neutron activation analysis where test
results must be extrapolated to determine their significance. See also Joseph Sanders, From Science to
Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 67. (Nov. 1993).
29 See Stephen D. Sugerman, The Need to Reform Personal Injury Law Leaving Scientific Dis-
putes to Scientists, 248 SciENcE 823 (1990).
80 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 2794.
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opinion regarding questions of scientific reliability.12 Moreover, it is
rather self-deceiving to pretend that a nonscientist trial judge's conclusions
regarding the scientific reliability of novel or controversial scientific evi-
dence are, or should be, anything more than that judge's acceptance of
what certain experts think. If a trial judge's amateur scientist review leads
to the conclusion that certain evidence is scientifically reliable, but the
weight of credible scientific opinion reaches the opposite conclusion, we
should hope the judge would question his own scientific reasoning, not the
scientists'.
The difficulty of the trial judge's scientific task under Daubert depends,
in part, on how fine a scientific judgment he must make and this in turn
depends on how much the proponent needs to show in order for reliability
to be "sufficiently" proved. The Daubert Court is intolerably vague on
what degree of scientific reliability the trial court should require before
admitting the evidence under Federal Rule 702."8
"Hard" and "Soft" Daubert
The Daubert Court states that "evidentiary reliability will be based
upon scientific validity" and focuses on whether the evidence was "de-
rived by the scientific method."'85 But "the scientific method" is not the
same for all disciplines of science and in any case does not specify a par-
ticular level of "appropriate validation" before a principle or methodology
is accepted as reliable."6 There are many different degrees of scientific
reliability and whether something is "reliable enough" depends upon the
use to which one wants to put it and the risk of error one is willing to
accept under those circumstances. 7
" See discussion at notes 48-49, infra.
" See, e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1183 (Ariz. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1578
(1994) (declining to adopt Daubert at this time, court observes that the nature of the requirement in
Daubert "is currently unknown, may vary from case to case, and is to be fashioned by trial judges
using an analytical framework as yet unspecified. In application, Daubert leaves many questions
unanswered.").
3 Id. at 2795 n.9 (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 2795.
" Id. at 2795 n.9. Even when a scientific discipline adopts certain conventions, such as the
choice in statistics of a p value (Alpha) of .05 as indicating the border of statistical significance, this is
of no help if the scientific disputes relate to the principles and methodologies underlying the statistics.
See Sanders, supra note 28, at 14-16.
31 Designers of nuclear power plants presumably seek extremely high levels of reliability in the
920 [Vol. 43
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I see Daubert receiving two general kinds of interpretations: "hard"
and "soft." The hard view will emphasize those portions of the Daubert
opinion that refer to validation, verification, and adherence to the scientific
method. It will tend to reject novel principles and methods that, although
promising, still lack comprehensive validation. 8 Likewise, controversial
scientific evidence will be rejected if the controversy shows problems in
methodology or deficiencies in verification that, from a scientific stand-
point, classify the evidence as still experimental.
This rather high standard for admission of scientific evidence would
have the advantage of insulating the jury, the least scientifically capable
component of the trial system, from the task of resolving scientific dis-
putes. One disadvantage of this hard approach is that it requires a trial
court to make a rather fine scientific judgment; to decide whether the sci-
entific support a proponent has mustered behind the offered evidence is
sufficient to prove that the evidence is "scientifically valid."'33
Other courts may take a softer approach to what Daubert requires.
They might find that as long as the offered evidence is generally based
upon scientifically valid principles and methodologies, the evidence should
be admitted. In other words, as long as the proponent has some scientific
support for the evidence, it will be admitted and disputes concerning its
reliability will go to the jury. Answering the concern that a lax rule of
admission "would result in a 'free-for-all'" before "befuddled juries" the
Daubert Court finds this assessment "overly pessimistic about the capabil-
ities of the jury, and of the adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-
principles and methods upon which they rely while a psychiatrist treating a patient, on the other
hand, may require less in the way of proof and reliability before using certain new principles or
techniques. Arguably the law should be more cautious in admitting disputed scientific evidence against
the accused in a criminal case than admitting such evidence in civil cases, see Giannelli, supra note 5,
at 1245-50, but the Daubert Court makes no such distinction. See also Moenssens, supra note 5, at 4.
" See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798-99 ("We recognize that in practice, a gatekeeping role for the
judge, no matter how flexible, on occasion will inevitably prevent the jury from learning of authentic
insights and innovations."). Critics of "junk science" in the courtroom are praising Daubert for
"tightening up on standards of scientific evidence." Phantom Risk Scientific Inference and the
Law-An Interview with the Editors, Civ. JusT. REt'., Jan. 1994, at 7 (Manhattan Institute's Judi-
cial Studies Program). This may be an effort at "spin control" on an opinion so vague that it led
another noted scholar to conclude that Daubert embraced a "very loose 'general relevancy' test."
Moenssens, supra note 5, at 4.
39 Id. at 2796. See E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches
For Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REv. 487, 500-01 (1989).
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examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on
the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence."
'40
But the issue is whether a jury should ever be given "shaky" science. It
may be a greater mistake to be overly optimistic than overly pessimistic
about the capabilities of juries when it comes to complex scientific issues,4
particularly those involving sophisticated quantitative analysis. The
Bendectin trials, for example, asked jurors to evaluate competing epidemi-
ological and statistical theories and analyses. As Professor Sander's excel-
lent study of the trials shows, even though the basic scientific issue re-
mained the same, of twenty Bendectin trials that went all the way to jury
verdict, plaintiffs won eight and defendants won twelve.' 2 An optimist
might point to the fact that the jury got it right 60% of the time.43 A
pessimist would say this is not much better than flipping a coin.
The key problem with any soft or lenient approach to the admission of
novel and controversial evidence is that it dumps the scientific disputes
onto the laps of the jury. The jury's obvious limitations in evaluating com-
plex scientific disputes cannot be overcome by the mythically powerful
tools of cross-examination and closing argument. Indeed, the traditional
formalisms of trial procedure sometimes inhibit rather than enhance the
search for scientific clarity."
The Daubert Court focuses its analysis on the term "scientific .. .
40 Id. at 2798.
41 See Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
105, 116 (1993) ("If we are going to make mistakes in assuming the validity of a novel technique,
they should be mistakes in delaying the admission of reliable evidence and not mistakes admitting
unreliable evidence.").
"' Sanders, supra note 28, at 9 tbl. 2, 158-60.
43 Professor Sanders shows that the great weight of scientific opinion supports the defense posi-
tion in the Bendectin cases. Five Bendectin cases were tried before judges and all five resulted in
defense verdicts.
44 If the jury is asked to resolve disputes concerning the scientific reliability of certain evidence,
they must be educated concerning the scientific principles and methods involved. The traditional direct
and cross-examination method of presenting evidence is not a highly effective instrument for educating
jurors about science. The "teachers" are usually experts hired by the parties and the jury naturally
suspects their neutrality. Cross-examination, of course, will attempt to further reduce the experts'
credibility in the eyes of the jury. The jurors are usually not allowed to ask the experts questions and
courts only recently have grown comfortable with allowing jurors to take notes in complex cases. See




knowledge" in Federal Rule 702 but pays little attention to the other re-
quirement in that Rule that the evidence in question "will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue.1
45
Subjecting a jury to a courtroom scientific debate over the reliability of
highly complex evidence neither assists the jury nor leads to a rational
determination of the facts at issue.
Of course, juries are asked to decide difficult, technical issues all the
time in medical malpractice cases, product liability suits, insanity defenses
in criminal trials and so forth. But such cases generally involve disputes
over the proper application of established and accepted principles and
methods. These issues are challenging enough to juries without com-
pounding their complexity by requiring juries to decide whether the un-
derlying principles and methods used by the various experts are scientifi-
cally reliable.
The Daubert Court saw itself balancing two competing goals: the lib-
eral admission of all relevant evidence, against the concern for the reliabil-
ity of that evidence."' But the results are more schizophrenic than bal-
anced. On the one hand, the Court speaks of a gatekeeper role for the trial
judge that is so strict as to "inevitably" lead to the occasional loss of "au-
thentic insights and innovations.', 7 On the other hand, the Court insists
that airing out the disputes before the jury is "the traditional and appro-
priate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."48
Prosecutors and plaintiffs' attorneys are eager to use novel and contro-
versial scientific evidence. They do not want to hear that their evidence, if
it is in fact reliable, will eventually be proven as such and accepted by
courts. They have real cases with real victims right now. Trying to "bal-
ance" these interests against the dangers of unreliable scientific evidence,
however, does not yield a comfortable middle ground. Science is the only
source of its own reliability. Anything less than complete deference to the
weight of credible scientific opinion concerning the reliability of scientific
evidence means going outside science-to the judge or jury, (or, in
Daubert, to an unspecified combination of the two)-to resolve a scientific
" The Court states that this part of Rule 702 "goes primarily to relevance," i.e., whether the
expert's testimony relates to any issue in the case. 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
46 Id. at 2798-99
47 Id. at 2799.
45 Id. at 2798.
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dispute. The resulting judgment cannot be scientific and therefore we can-
not honestly speak of the evidence as having "scientific" reliability.
Deferring to Science
I would turn Daubert on its head. Daubert states that while the opin-
ion of good scientists regarding the scientific reliability of the evidence in
question is probative, it is not dispositive of the "real" issue: "Is the evi-
dence in fact scientifically reliable?" A better rule, I believe, would state
that while a nonscientist trial judge's own understanding of the scientific
principles and methods in question may be important and useful, the
"real" issue is whether good scientists consider the evidence reliable at this
time.
It may seem odd to exalt what scientists think of the reliability of evi-
dence over whether the evidence is "really" reliable. But it is more a case
of preferring what we can know over what we cannot know; of nonscien-
tists showing a little humility in the world of science. A courtroom battle
of the experts before a nonscientist judge or jury is not a logical, and
certainly not a scientific, way of resolving a scientific dispute. The focus
instead should be on determining whether the weight of scientific opinion
supports one side or another.
Focusing on what scientists think of the evidence is reflective of the
Frye rule. I do not recommend a return to the general acceptance standard
of the Frye rule which was too narrowly focused on whether the scientific
principles and methods in question had passed successfully through some
rather idealized process of scientific review and acceptance. The inquiry
must be broader than that. Even if the scientific principles or methods in
question have not yet been widely disseminated or reviewed in the scien-
tific community, the court should consider whether good scientists who
have reviewed the science believe the evidence is reliable and that "general
acceptance" is only a matter of time.
Trying to determine the preponderance of scientific opinion concerning
the reliability of a novel principle or technique is not always easy. The
parties' experts are biased. Counsel try to select those experts who are
willing to be as firm and convincing as possible on their points, a posture
more reflective of the adversary process than scientific inquiry. Many ex-
perts come to court with professional stakes involved. Getting a trial court
[Vol. 43
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to accept a novel or controversial scientific principle such as "repressed
memories" or "clinical ecology" is a professional coup for a scientist who
has been fighting for the respectability of the new theory."9 It can be diffi-
cult for a trial judge to find the weight of good scientific opinion in all this
partisan wrangling.
Whatever the practical difficulties the trial judge faces in trying to de-
termine the weight of scientific opinion on the issue, it still is easier than a
trial judge trying to reach his or her own scientific opinion on the subject.
While most trial judges are not capable of doing science, they are quite
experienced in evaluating issues of credibility."0 Moreover, the trial judge
is not restricted to the testimony of the parties' experts but may include
two other potentially very useful sources of help. The first is any research
or publication on the scientific issue by other experts who have not been
hired to testify. The trial judge would not be reviewing the research and
publications for their scientific content, but only for their conclusions and
the scientific credibility of those behind the conclusions.
The best source of help on these issues, however, is the court-appointed
expert who is hired, not to give a "third opinion" on the individual merits
of the case, but only to present a neutral review of the research and litera-
ture and an assessment of the scientific reliability of the underlying princi-
ples and methods at issue.5" The court-appointed expert also could assist
the trial judge in evaluating the credentials and relevant expertise of the
various scientists involved.
Finally, in deciding how much evidence of reliability a trial judge
should require before admitting novel or controversial scientific evidence,
the standard should not be static but should adjust to the nature and com-
plexity of the scientific dispute in question. The purpose of the trial
4' See Dan L. Burk, When Scientists Act Like Lawyers: The Problem of Adversary Science, 33
JURIMETRICS J. 363, 368-70 (1993).
50 Focusing on credibility does not mean that a trial judge should ignore what she knows about
the scientific issues involved. To the extent that the judge's own scientific knowledge aides her in
critically evaluating what the experts are saying, it substantially assists in her evaluation of the ex-
perts' scientific credibility. The general, external factors a trial court should consider i evaluating the
scientific credibility of an expert include the expert's training, education, current position, publication
and grant record, and experience as peer reviewer, conference participant or similar roles that reflect
recognition by fellow scientists. Finally, the degree to which the expert's position has been supported
in the scientific community is an important factor in evaluating the expert's scientific credibility.
"* See Elliott, supra note 39; FED. R. EVID. 706.
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judge's gatekeeping role is twofold. First, and easiest, is to screen out evi-
dence based upon principles and methods so untested and unsupported
that no reasonable factfinder could or should rely upon them. Second, the
trial court should screen out evidence that although it has some scientific
support, substantial questions remain regarding its scientific reliability
and resolving those questions is not something nonscientist jurors can ra-
tionally accomplish. Thus if the scientific disputes in a particular case are
not too technical, but relatively narrow and within the realm of a lay
person's comprehension, the trial judge can be comfortable admitting such
evidence upon a modest showing of scientific support and letting the jury
hear and resolve the disputes.52 But if the scientific disputes concern
highly technical5 or complicated issues that a jury will not comprehend,
let along master, the trial judge should require a strong showing of estab-
lished scientific support before admitting the evidence.
Conclusion
Daubert is not likely to be of much help to trial courts trying to manage
the flow of new scientific theories and techniques into the courtroom.
While it is a relief to some that Daubert did not adopt a "let-it-all-in"
general relevancy standard, and a relief to others that Daubert did not
embrace the strict Frye rule, the result is a rather vague standard of "sci-
entific reliability" that may put trial judges and even juries in the inap-
propriate position of trying to evaluate disputed science on its own terms.
The fact that the Frye standard of "general acceptance" was unnecessarily
strict does not detract from its premise that the courts must defer to the
weight of scientific opinion in regards to matters of science. In obscuring
this basic premise, the Daubert Court invites the rather Orwellian pros-
pect of law judges "deeming" what is and is not good science.
82 An example is using bite mark identification evidence. While there are reliability issues con-
cerning use of such evidence, the issues are not extremely technical. See Robert A. De La Cruz, Note,
Forensic Dentistry and the Law: Is Bite Mark Evidence Here to Stay?, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 983
(1987).
" The Bendectin trials, for example, involved "five general categories of scientific evidence...
structure-activity, in vitro, in vivo, epidemiology, and secular trend data." Sanders, supra note 28, at
18.
[Vol. 43
